Multiculturalism: The Ideology of the New World Order

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Abstract: Multiculturalism represents an unjustified shift from “individualism” to “community-centrism”. For multiculturalism, community is an eternal structure that exists prior to and beyond the activities of its constituting members. It is a transcendental form, an ideally proposed frame independent of real, actual human beings. Consequently, multiculturalism attributes essential properties to tradition and culture, romanticizes the past and particular cultural and traditional practices regardless of their content. It not only produces and reproduces social, economic, and political inequalities and injustices but also, by attributing a permanent essence to such human products as culture and tradition, eternalizes “racial,” “national,” “ethnic,” “tribal,” “religious,” and “sectarian” differences as perpetual identities, ghettoizes the society and justifies its “Iraqization.” Hence, it emerges as a new form of essentialist ideology when it comes to resolving the question of human identity.

A trend both in academic and political circles uncritically promotes all cultures and traditions. Some “radical left” figures, groups and organizations are among the most prominent advocates of this trend despite that the inherent values in these “cultures” and traditional frameworks are mostly misogynist, homophobic, anti-egalitarian, and xenophobic. Multiculturalism serves the benefits of capitalism in the era of the New World Order. It not only produces and reproduces social, economic, and political inequality and injustice but also, by attributing a permanent essence to such human products as culture and tradition, eternalizes “racial,” “national,” “ethnic,” “tribal,” “religious,” and “sectarian” differences as perpetual identities, ghettoizes the society and justifies the “Iraqization” of the society.

Multiculturalism does not signify a simple practical or political directedness in reaction to immediate political issues as some of its proponents claim. Rather, it designates a totality of beliefs, a general framework through which humans are conceptualized and are defined in a certain form, are attributed certain properties and are claimed to have a peculiar identity. Culture, in this picture, is that transcendental paradigm, the magical apparatus that allegedly resolves the enigma of human identity. In this sense, multiculturalism is a theoretical system that produces and reproduces false identities and thus false consciousness. Hence, it is more appropriate to consider it an ideology or an ideological system similar to religion, nationalism etc.

Multiculturalism has also affinities with identity politics or the so-called politics of recognition. It serves as a theoretical apparatus for determining the “natural material” that is presupposed by identity politics, say, ethnicity, tribe, race, culture, etc. In presenting the political outcome of identity politics as a natural entity, it once again assumes an ideological role; i.e., it turns the relation between cause and effect upside down; it presents the politically recognized, say, culture or ethnicity, as a natural entity that needs to be politically expressed. Thus, an analysis of the theoretical framework of politics of recognition also reveals certain elements central to multicultural ideology.

The Methodological Aspect

On the methodological level multiculturalism, in its most general form, represents an unjustified shift from “individualism” to “community-centrism”. This unjustified shift
that can be traced in the writings of many multiculturalist (mainstream and leftist) authors represents the inadequacy of multiculturalist view in analysis of culture, which can be labeled as “culture-fetishism”. Analyzing commodity as a category of capitalist mode of production Marx states,

A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men’s labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour. (1996, 82)

Marx calls this phenomenon fetishism of commodity. A consequence of commodity fetishism is that the products of human activity appear to them as definite, independent entities. Marx explains this by making an analogy between commodity fetishism and religious beliefs: the phantoms of human thinking starts appear to them as independent entities that enter into relation with one another and with human individuals.

In political economy fetishism of commodity also appears as conceiving capital as an independent entity that belongs to individual capitalists. Hence, the fetishist views capital not as a social relation but as a thing-in-itself. The fetishist conceives the general social capital not as the social relation between the capital and the workforce but as the sum of individual capitals in society.

**Culture Fetishism**

The same fragmented conception is visible in multiculturalist analysis of culture. Reification and culture fetishism are manifest in the way that culture is analyzed as an association of arbitrary elements. The implicit assumption is that culture is a meta-historical, self-contained category or form. The elements that form this category and fill its content are chosen arbitrarily. A quick look at how “sub-cultures” or “cultural identities” are named in, e.g. the USA or Canada is useful. Blacks, for instance, are referred to as African-Americans, Chinese and other people from Far East are called Asian-Americans. Natives are called aboriginals or first nations. People from the Middle East are called Muslims or Arabs. Jews form another category, so on and so forth. What is striking is the random use of and reference to elements of ethnicity, geographical origin, religion, and race. Multiculturalism, be it right-wing liberal or left-wing constructionist, attributes essentiality to culture. It neither needs nor can provide a unique, exclusive definition of “culture”. The choice of these arbitrary elements that are covered by the blanket-term “culture” is made with respect to particular—overt or covert—sociopolitical siding.

The fetishist view of culture and basic rights of persons, which conceives these products as reified entities, is manifest in the following: “a secure cultural context also ranks among the primary goods, basic to most people’s prospect for living what they can identify as a good life” (Gutmann 1994, 5). Gutmann considers “needs” as immutable. Needs, in her view, are not social products; they are not product of social human activity. Rather, they are social in a naturalistic, reified way: for some or for all communities a “secured cultural context” is claimed to be a basic right. Multiculturalists ignore the historic-social aspect of the question about culture. Perhaps some persons demand a secured cultural context as a need in order for them to feel free; once such a need is in
demand it may be supplied. The magic hands of liberal market economy are once again at work.

Sociality of need has a different meaning than what Gutmann suggests. Need is determined by human activity within the limits of technical-cognitive abilities—where such technical-cognitive ability includes conceptual and ideational stockpile too. Need is not something in-itself; no need is essential and therefore it is subject to change. Virtually speaking, human needs are infinite; the scope of human needs is much broader than what a person from within a particular socio-historical position can define it. Gutmann’s view above conceives the needs of the “minority” culture limited in time and space. Moreover, it considers need as a homogenizing element: members of a particular community, in this view, cannot have a peculiar need of themselves and they cannot determine what “social needs” should be. This resonates the traditional liberal dualism that contraposes the individual to the social.

Taylor, formulating the theory of political recognition, reveals a similar type of approach to human needs. He states, “Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need” (1994, 26).

What is the content of this “need”? Does recognition mean recognizing the rights of the individual such as the right to life, right to freedom, and to happiness? To fill the content of the political needs of the yet-to-be-recognized people with anything beyond rights of humans means attributing eternality to a socio-historical situation and dehumanizing the yet-to-be-recognized persons by subordinating one’s humanity and personality to some particular aspect of one’s activity—a particular socio-historical situation, after all, is the outcome of human praxis. In other words, this view ignores the historical limitations and conditions that yield to reification of the products of human activity; it amounts to an uncritical approval of the existing mode of alienation as mere self-realization, thus proposing it as inevitable and necessary.

Even the “ushering” function of democracy (Taylor 1994, 27) is presented as if it is a sui generis process in which humans partake only contingently and mechanically. Thus follows the enigmatic change of politics of equal recognition that “has now returned in the form of demands for equal status of cultures and genders” (Taylor 1994, 27). Reification of culture, in this case, takes place in form of personification of culture as an organic unity, a body, which has an existence by itself that transcends the existence and activity of persons that are in fact its producers.

In order to legitimize this stance, Taylor bases his argument on Herder’s formulation, which clearly bears the mark of the aforementioned personification of culture. Herder attributes originality not only to individual persons but also to “culture-bearing people”, to Volk (Taylor 1994, 31). A Volk should be true to its own culture. As Sarah Song puts it, Taylor’s position conceives culture as an “irreducibly social culture”. In this view culture is the expression of the authenticity of a Volk (2007, 17). This view amounts to demands for cultural preservation. “A conception of culture as coherent, self-contained, and tightly knitted wholes is at the heart of multiculturalists’ case for cultural preservation” (Song 2007, 32).

Taylor is aware that the mind, the human self is not an entity in itself. He writes, “The genesis of human mind is in this sense not monological, not something each person accomplishes on his or her own, but dialogical” (1994, 32). Taylor rightly argues that the dialogicality of the mind is not confined to its genesis only but it contains its present
mode of being too (1994, 32-3). However, he does not argue against the idea of a self-contained, inner self. Rather, he argues that this self should be conceived not monologically but dialogically. Yet, this dialogicality simply requires reciprocal activity of externally situated and self-contained individuals.

Taylor claims that the whole modern idea of individual is based on the dialogical relationship among human individuals. However, he takes the individual as an abstract entity, where social relations and individual’s position within the social order has no particular influence on the formation of this person as a specific self. Consequently, Taylor does not fall short in introducing race, ethnicity, gender, and religion as aspects of human self that reside outside the boundaries that are defined by social relations; these factors are added to Taylor’s allegedly dialogical relation between individuals from without. Taylor’s position on this reminds of Bauer’s allegedly Hegelian stance concerning history that Marx criticizes;

Hegel’s conception of history presupposes an Abstract or Absolute Spirit which develops in such a way that mankind is a mere mass that bears the Spirit with a varying degree of consciousness or unconsciousness. Within empirical, exoteric history, therefore, Hegel makes a speculative, esoteric history, develop. The history of mankind becomes the history of the Abstract Spirit of mankind, hence a spirit far removed from the real man. (1975)

Taylor then arrives at the politics of difference stance. The question he never answers is the identification of the uniqueness of the self with that of culture. In his view all cultures are equally valuable. He treats this as a principle that is supposedly an instantiation of the principle of dignity that attributes a universal value to human life.

There are a number of problems which this approach ignores. First, culture, obviously, is not identical with a person or with an amalgamation of persons. Second, culture is an artifact. We may attribute value to all artifacts that humans produce; yet, this does not exclude the possibility that some artifacts are “better” than others or that some are dangerous even to the persistence of the human kind (e.g. nuclear weapons, Auschwitz). The universality of the values that is attributed to human being is based on the simple fact of humanity of that particular person –as simple as the fact that he or she is born to human society. This principle may also be extended to embrace the organic life of non-human animals, if one wishes. However, this value cannot be universalized so that it embraces all artifacts and human products –be it physical or ideational. Such transcription is both logically and actually illegitimate. An axe, at a particular moment, may be more valuable than a bow or vice versa. Even when it comes to human personality and consciousness, there may be traits of behavior that are unacceptable. For instance, the right to life of a convict should be guaranteed; however, this cannot be simply transcribed to the acceptability of the behavior that has resulted in his or her conviction.

Taylor’s associationist conviction that reduces culture to an amalgamation of reified elements becomes more evident when he states, “How we do things covers [only] issues such as right to life and to freedom of speech” (Taylor 1994, 63) and this is how we do things here: If you don’t love it, we don’t say leave it, but we let you exercise your own “culture” only in your ghettos and among your fellow culture-mates and wallow in your own filth.
Taylor argues that the presumption or the demand for “respecting all cultures” is a logical extension of liberal principle of “politics of equal respect” (1994, 68). If culture is not considered a thing-in-itself but a product of human activity, then one cannot make such a demand or presumption based on the aforementioned liberal principle. Humans, supposedly, ought to respect other persons. However, they cannot be expected to respect whatever values a person has or produces. Principle of equal respect also requires conceiving humans as the author of the laws and regulations they submit to—of course, this is true ideally only, if people enjoy an actual state of equality. This means that humans not only deserve respect, but also are answerable with regard to their activities and whatever they create and produce. Taylor’s demand for unconditional respect for “cultures”, notwithstanding the aforementioned logical deficiency, reveals the low-scale racism that is implicit in this approach, which expresses itself in form of a paternalistic uncritical approval of the culture of the “other”—e.g., the underprivileged, subordinated, and the immigrant communities.

Taylor and multiculturalists assume that whatever is produced within a culture is the private property of that culture. Taylor’s discussion concerning the school curriculum debates discloses this aspect of his approach. It can be true that the existing curricula have been made by some who may have racial and/or Eurocentric prejudices. However, both sides agree that what the “white” man has written belong to white men and what the “colored” has written belongs to colored ones. Both sides of the debate assume that the products of a group of people belong to that group or to their alleged genetic successors and not to humanity. Liberal abstract universalism and multicultural particularism meet at this conjunction. For instance, Saul Bellow demands “other” cultures to bring forth their own Tolstoy if they want their demand to be included in curricula to be met; he obviously defends the idea of supremacy of the so-called liberal West\(^1\). Multiculturalists, in response, negate this requirement and demand inclusion of “genuine” artifacts of other forms produced by other cultures into the curricula. Both sides, however, agree that Tolstoy, modern novel, Beethoven, etc belong to “white”, Western “culture” exclusively.

According to Blum “equal worth of cultures” that Taylor proposes is a meaningless notion that should be discarded (1998, 75). Blum’s consideration of cultural recognition of individuals is an attempt to theorize and conceptualize what I identify as the significance of culture fetishism. Answering the question “in what recognition consists with regard to individual” he states, “The obvious feature is according explicit acknowledgement the cultural marker or markers that the individual regards as indicating her distinctive cultural identity (for one this could be language, for other it could be food, music, etc)” (1998, 78-9). Blum is aware that no particular aspect or a group of aspects can be attributed as the element(s) of defining and determining cultures. However, he chooses to valorize this ambiguity or vagueness by promoting it to a theoretical level.

Blum also claims, recognition need involves no evaluative judgment at all, nor is it particularly appropriate, or even natural, to engage in assessing the culture of the student or

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\(^1\) This is quoted in Taylor 1994, 42. Taylor, in a note there writes, “I have no idea whether this statement was actually made in this form by Saul Bellow, or by anyone else. I report it only because it captures a widespread attitude, which is, of course, why the story had currency in the first place.”
the cultural group, when all that us at stakes is recognizing that forms of cultural expression and historical experiences of the group are important to that student, and that in the context of a school, they warrant an institutional acknowledgement. (1998, 81)

Blum rightly criticizes Taylor for not explaining and justifying the claim that recognition of cultures requires and includes attributing value to that culture. In other words, the passage from respecting the dignity of the individual to respecting culture is illegitimate. Yet, Blum ignores that such a demand for valorization is implicit in the politics of identity. Recognition can simply mean acknowledging the existence of a culture as an artifact and further acknowledging that that artifact has some value for someone. However, for the politics of difference, recognition bears a positive load just as the “right to self-determination” bears a positive load for nationalism. Blum’s stance, thus, appears as a pre-emptive move in order to prevent a “negative” evaluation, that is, any criticism of acknowledged cultures. Consequently, Blum, unwillingly it may be, arrives at a relativist stance (1998, 83). Ironically, relativism goes hand in hand with the idea that cultures have equal worth. Taylor’s point is not that cultures have an equal value with respect to some common measure. Rather, he states that we should not only acknowledge a culture but also should respect the ways of life that are dictated by that culture. This last aspect is identical with the practical outcome of cultural relativism.

Blum’s resolution to the problem of “equal value” of cultures is relativizing and fetishizing valorization. This means “treating each culture in its own rights and admitting that each culture contains something of value” (1998, 85). Thus, he arrives at the demand for coexistence of cultures, which are neither equal nor unequal. Blum suggests leaving them to exist, as if they are immovable, self-contained architectonics.

The debate about valorization of culture is in response to the problem of producing demeaning imagery of certain groups. The source of demeaning self-imagery is the automatic attribution of a certain identity to a person. Mostly, the presumed identity is based on stereotypes that yield such demeaning imagery. One should consider the ways such an identity and imagery is reflected upon a group of people and thus on the members of that group as well as the ways a particular image of a “culture” is produced. For instance, female genital mutilation is not a component of a culture that determines a group’s identity. Rather, it is a practice of certain human beings that should be criticized and banned as it is part of a misogynist, discriminative human activity. For multiculturalists such a case would be a deadlock because they do not consider culture a product of human activity. Rather, they assign a sui generis existence and an internal worth to cultures. In the absence of a concept of culture as product of human practice one ends up in either approving such a practice or in using it as a source of forming demeaning imagery about those particular people. One could also covertly approve this practice by relativizing valorization of practices. The irony is in that both racism and multiculturalism consider the victims of such acts as participants and members of those “cultures” but not as human beings in need of support. This is how multiculturalism contributes to the reproduction of demeaning self-imagery of members of a society.

Guiliana Prato also draws attention to the illegitimacy and political dangers of attributing the rights of the individual to communities or cultures. He states that both Gutmann (1994) and Tamir (1999) are critical of bestowing rights on collectivities or communities, since such attribution of rights to groups forms a threat to individual
freedoms. Prato states, “In emphasizing group rights multiculturalism presents itself as a form of cultural determinism that curtails citizens’ freedom of choice… By celebrating diversity in the form of group membership, multiculturalism does not breakdown cultural barriers; it reinforces both the barriers and the attendant cultural stereotypes (2009, 16). Multicultural recognition is inherently limited in two other interrelated ways: First, abstract—contentless view of culture, which may be conceived as reified or fetishist view of culture. Second, multiculturalism regards culture as immutable.

Habermas formulates the aforementioned problem of the shift from the rights of the individual to “collective” rights as follows: The basic tension in constitutional democracies is the problem of reconciliation of “individually designed” laws with the collective demands of recognition and dignity (1994, 107-8). Habermas claims that liberalism and social-democracy can overcome this tension, or at least they suggest an affirmative answer to this tension.

Despite his proper formulation of the question, Habermas falls short in articulating the real reasons behind such tension. Liberalism, traditionally, attributes rights to the individual because it considers individual as a self-contained, autonomous entity. Thus, the duty of the state and of political society, theoretically and ideally speaking, is to protect these rights of the individuals. If there is a tension between the social and the individual, it should be resolved in the benefit of the individual. This follows from the traditional liberal stance that contrasts the individual and the social. Society, in this classical picture, is an association of free individuals, just as any meaningful generalization is an association of atomic impressions and ideas. So be the case, rights of the individual cannot coherently be attributed to the social. In order to surmount this difficulty, a naturalistic notion of society is introduced. Thus follows the culturist views that propose the one-sided determination of the individual by the social, i.e. social determinism. Yet, the attempts of theorizing such determinism will vary from thinker to thinker. Where Taylor formulates the tension between the individual and the social as an opposition between theory of rights and cultural differences and then tends to resolve it with reference to dialogicality of the individual, Habermas proposes that the two are compatible and intends to resolve the aforementioned tension with reference to notions of authorship of the law and intersubjectivity.

Taylor’s conception of cultural rights, according to Habermas, misinterprets the Kantian dictum that “those to who the law is addressed can acquire autonomy only to the extent that they can understand themselves to be the authors of the laws to which they are subject as private legal persons” (1994, 112). There is no blindness to differences, however, on the side of the theory of individual rights because, according to Habermas, individual identity is conceived intersubjectively: “People become individualized only through a process of socialization” (1994, 113).

Although Habermas tries to show that there is an “internal” link between the social and the individual, his definition of process of socialization reveals the atomic-individualist tendencies in his formulation. In the final analysis, the process of socialization is external to the subject, which implies that the subject is conceived as an entity independent of society and sociality. Thus, the tension between the individual and the social remains unresolved.

Similarly, traits of cultural fetishism are also visible in Habermas’ account of identity politics. He states, “Feminism, multiculturalism, nationalism, and the struggle
against Eurocentric heritage of colonialism are related phenomena that should not be confused with one another” (1994, 116). Although he warns about the conceptual complexities that may result from confusing these phenomena, Habermas treats all of them as if they belong to the same level of abstraction: nation, as well as culture is confined with gender, which is biologically determined. And all these are being related to the just cause of struggling against colonialism. Habermas considers nation and culture as *sui generis* entities. This essentialist aspect becomes more evident in Habermas’ treatment of self-recognition of women. If a self is a socially-culturally determined entity, where society and culture stands for blanket terms that denote phenomena external to the subjectivity of the subject, then how “women’s cultural self-understanding” can provide any ground for criticizing existing the social order and cultural context to the end of emancipation of women?

Will Kymlicka’s approach to the questions regarding culture, minorities, ethnicities and nations is another showcase of multicultural fetishist conception of culture. In his “Reply to Kukathas (1992),” for instance, he conceives the relation between the so-called “culture” and the individual so that first, culture one-sidedly and absolutely determines the individual; and second, all “members” of the so-called culture are determined by it homogeneously; i.e., whatever this culture is, it is evenly distributed and has evenly determined its alleged members.

It is on the basis of these hidden premises that Kymlicka infers, “[special rights] are indeed required by the view that justice requires removing or compensating for undeserved or “morally arbitrary” disadvantages, particularly if there are “profound and pervasive and present from birth” (Rawls, 1971, 96)” (1992, 140).

Kukathas underscores a central flaw in multicultural approaches while pointing at a shortcoming in Kymlicka’s theory: not all members of minority cultures suffer the same disadvantages and not all disadvantaged are members of minority cultures (1992, 141). To put it more generally, the so-called “cultures” are not isolated wholes; they are interacting with other cultures; moreover, they are the products of human activity and social interaction and carry the stamp of the time they persist in. Inequalities, therefore, are not product of cultures and neither exclusive to a number of them—say minority cultures. Inequalities, alongside other qualities and social relations are being continuously produced; cultures are the carriers of inequalities inherited from the past, say, discrimination against certain communities and their members, and not the demiurges of these inequalities.

Inequality in this view is just a matter of getting advantage of something and not a matter of produced and reproduced social relations. In other words, according to this view, the source of suffering certain inequalities or being discriminated against is not social relations but is membership in a particular culture and/or community. Thus, it stays an enigma how these inequalities can be surmounted at all: why should a culture, say a dominant “white” culture, that enjoys the “advantages” of being dominant and being discriminative against other cultures should agree to assume certain measures that benefit the disadvantaged culture and its members? That is why Kukathas states that Kymlicka’s suggestion is also unacceptable for liberals (perhaps for the theorists of the dominant, advantaged culture). Does Kymlicka suggest any other solution than reliance on the mercy of the dominants? And what is the source of such a mercy if it exists at all?
Perhaps, it is an implicit aspect of the dominant, white culture; a natural attribute of a certain group of people.

Even if we accept Kymlicka’s argument that we can acquire a balance between the liberal notion of individual rights and special rights of minority cultures, who is to decide how an individual is defined and determined in a particular culture? There is an unresolvable tension at the core of Kymlicka’s conceptualization of individuality and culture. He takes both the individual and culture (interchangeably community) as sui generis entities; he conceives of them from a naturalist-liberalist stance; in other words, he takes the individual, the real human person, as the embodiment and the instantiation of the liberal notion of “individual” on the one hand, and as the instantiation of “culture” on the other hand. It is then implied that the dominant culture that is endowed with liberal values promotes the individuality and independence of persons, that is, the dominant, liberal culture is so structured that it submits to its own instantiation, while, when it comes to the disadvantaged cultures, they are so conceived that they do not attribute independence to the person, which is its instantiation or embodiment. In other words, members of liberal cultures are independent and liberal, members of disadvantaged cultures or non-liberal cultures are non-liberal and disadvantaged. Notwithstanding the obvious determinism of this account, as a well-intentioned member of liberal culture he assumes the right to first submit the right of the individuals and the cultures to enjoy certain rights and privileges, and second, he assumes the right to decide what element should be preserved in certain cultures with reference to liberal cultural standards.

This tension or shortcoming is also visible in Kymlicka’s “Categorizing Groups, Categorizing States” (2010). Criticizing/elaborating on Walzer’s theory, Kymlicka treats “ethnically divided societies” as given, in-themselves entities; in other words, for Kymlicka it is the given ethnicity that brings about ethnic division; the political division is based on some apolitically and a-historically given identity. Hence, his criticism of Walzer for ignoring this “given” diversity (2010, 372). In this view language, history, and culture are treated on the same footing:

1. Kymlicka simply ignores the fact that neither of the aforementioned has any reality and significance independent from social relations.
2. The differences between languages, historiographies, and “cultures” are also, in the final analysis, and at a very basic level, consequences of human activity. Moreover, at a more particular level, these differences acquire political significance because they have been made politically, that is, they acquire political significance within the framework of modern capitalist society, for instance, in the process of nation-formation. Kymlicka’s stance is just the altruistic expression of “diversity”. In this, it turns into the justification of the status-quo. The point, however, is to explain this diversity and differentiation.

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2 This meta-historical, naturalist view of history is also visible in Cohen and Kymlicka’s (1988) treatment of Marx’s view of history. They claim that the tendency of economic growth is independent of social structure (172); that is, it is rooted in human nature and human situation. This implies that there is a meta-historical “human nature”. However, there is no “productive force”, in Marx’s conception, which is independent of and is external to the socio-historical conditions.
Kymlicka’s stance is like pointing to the social stratification, “identifying” that some are poor and some rich, and then make a virtue (a theory) out of this. The point, however, is to explain the phenomena of poverty and wealth and the reality of this very stratification.

Nancy Fraser’s discussion of politics of recognition reveals the theoretical and political affinities between mainstream and leftist conceptions of culture. According to Fraser, the rise of politics of recognition is neither a lapse into “false consciousness” nor a redressing of the culture-blindness of socialism (1998, 19). Fraser intends to develop a “critical theory of recognition” so that only those politics of difference that are coherently compatible with social politics of equality are defended. Her main thesis is that justice requires both redistribution and recognition (1998, 20).

Instead of providing a holistic monist theory that includes political answers and solutions to certain burning social questions such as national-ethnic and sexual discrimination from within a radical egalitarian perspective, Fraser reverberates the traditional left stance that is after forming collations and alliances of the “oppressed”. Both traditional left and Fraser view the social world as fragmented and divided into identities. Political movements, in this view, are the expression of the struggle of identities toward realization of their rights, just as for Taylor and liberal multiculturalists politics is the expression of a culture. Consequently, Fraser aims at providing a theory that functions as a magical agglutinating device.

According to Fraser recognition promotes the putative specificity of a group while redistribution aims at abolishing the economic base of group specificity (1998, 24). Thus follows the redistribution-recognition dilemma.

Fraser’s understanding of class and class relations is the counterpart of culture-fetishist conceiving of identity. Class, for Fraser, first and foremost, is but another form of identity that, due to goodwill of redistribution politicians, ought to be abolished. Moreover, it is a conglomeration of individual labor-force sellers. This is to view the class through individual bourgeois lenses as a fetish that is best expressed in trade unionism. This view does not consider class a social relation but as a physical-mechanical relation of some end-products, that is, workers. This fetishist look at class that reduces class into a guild of individual work-force sellers is visible in Fraser’s example of the homosexual worker. She states, “Sexuality in this conception is a mode of social differentiation whose roots do not lie in political economy, as homosexuals are distributed throughout the entire class structure of capitalist society, occupy no distinctive position in the division of labor and do not constitute an exploited class” (1998, 26). According to this view exploitation takes place in the workshop only. With the same token, a worker is not exploited when he or she is asleep or when she or he is unemployed. Following the same path of reasoning one can say that human being is not alienated as a result of existing mode of production which is a social relation, because human beings are distributed throughout the entire class structure of capitalist society. Fraser’s stance is a distortion of Marx’s analysis of political economy and process of production that continuously produces and reproduces capitalist society together with its political economy. This view fails to see that society itself is the very product of relations of production and is thus a social relation. All relations, roles, inequalities, and injustices are continuously produced and reproduced within the existing society and are parts of social relations. Certain inequalities, for instance sexual discrimination, may be rooted in
and inherited from past. However, this does not make sexual discrimination an archaic problem; sexual discrimination is produced at present, under capitalist mode of production and thus the struggle against such discrimination is an aspect of class struggle. Interestingly, Fraser’s position reminds of Bauer’s position concerning the Jewish Question. As Marx states, “Religious questions of the day have at the present time a social significance. It is no longer a question of religious interests as such. Only the theologian can believe it is a question of religion as religion” (1975, 108). The “cultural-valuational” structure of society” that is the root of, e.g., discrimination against homosexuals is itself being produced now, at present, under the existing relations of production. Fraser, to the contrary, conceives both class and culture as atomic things in themselves.

In considering gender and race as “bivalent” cases, Fraser fails to see that the identity that is attributed to a specific gender or race is itself the product of the discriminatory dominant ideology. The immediate response to sexual or any other form of discrimination is abolishing discrimination and construing reverse discrimination if necessary. However, abolishing discrimination and imposing reverse discrimination does not have to be transcribed into the recognition of this very identity as something sui generis, just as the response to racial apartheid is not a “black apartheid state” or the response to national discrimination is not an automatic affirmation of the right to self-determination or an ethnic federalist state.

Marx’s reconstruction of Absolute Critical speculative philosophy sheds light on one of the most important aspects of culture fetishist point of view. The speculative thinker reduces the real entities into manifestations of an essence, which is arrived at through mere abstraction. Reifying this abstract idea as the substance, the real thing appears as its semblances. The multitude of the real being is explained as the manifestation of the self-movement of the substance—the real becomes a mode of this substance only. This line of reasoning is not limited to speculative “criticism” only. The political-economic view of capital as self-generating wealth and the idea of culture, not as the totality and ever-changing products of human activity but as a self-contained fetish, are among other examples of such an outlook. If culture determines, in the way multiculturalist claim it does, the being of its members, then how the diversity within one culture is to be explained? How come, say, I am different than my fellow culture-mate?

The multiculturalist might answer, “due to self-movement of culture”. Just as “speculative philosophy has as many incarnations as there are things, just as it has here in every fruit an incarnation of the Sub stance, of the Absolute Fruit”, the multiculturalist has as many incarnations of Culture as there are real human individuals. Notwithstanding the enigma why Culture manifests this self-movement in the form of culture, at other times in the form of individual person. Perhaps, some Medieval-type theory of emanation is at work.

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3 Marx further adds, “Consequently Herr Bauer has no inkling that real secular Jewry, and hence religious Jewry too, is being continually produced by the present-day civil life and finds its final development in the money system. He could not have any inkling of this because he did not know Jewry as a part of the real world but only as a part of his world, theology; because he, a pious, godly man, considers not the active everyday Jew but the hypocritical Jew of the Sabbath to be the real Jew” (1975, 109).
The Political Aspect: Essentialism

Multiculturalism and cultural relativism have also a number of immediate political consequences. Multiculturalism divides and categorizes people illegitimately and unjustifiably. In this view, the idea of human rights regardless of certain historical and social attributes is not plausible. This is to say that, in multiculturalist view humans do not have human identity per se, and neither have they human rights.

Culture as a political phenomenon is the product of culturist movements just as nation is the product of nationalism. Culturism, in most of the cases, is a covert form of particularist, localist, nationalist, religious, or ethnicist politics. Ontologically speaking, culture does not exist independent from human activity. Culture is not a *sui generis* entity. Regardless of this dependency, culture, in the hand of culturist movements, is made into an imaginary self-contained entity that has the ability to mobilize groups of people in service of certain terrestrial benefits. The alleged essentiality of culture and its appearance in the political scene as a political entity does not make it ontologically self-contained; culture does not become an in-itself entity just as nation does not become an itself entity and never loses its socio-historical determinations despite the claims and wishes of the nationalist movements. Attributing essentiality to culture out of goodwill reproduces this reified image of culture as a permanent, in-itself entity, and consequently, voluntarily or involuntarily, contributes to strengthening of culturist ideology and political position.

It is interesting to see that how liberal thinkers that criticize Marx for what they call “determinism” in his system that supposedly deprives human beings from their freedom of will and choice lean toward the crudest types of historical determinism that is expressed in works of Maoist-inspired authors such as Fanon and traditional left organizations that formulate this allegedly “Marxist” historical determinism in form of “theory of stage”. Thus, Taylor, in order to justify the expansion of traditional liberal conception of rights of individual so that it covers the realm of cultures and to legitimize disregarding the contradictions between the liberal conception and identity-politics approach to the question, refers to Fanon: “The struggle for freedom and equality **must** therefore pass through a revision of these images” (1994, 66, emphasis added).

Attributing an immutable essence to “culture” is another common aspect of multiculturalist (mainstream and left) conceiving of culture. Taylor’s elaboration of what he calls the clash between the two modes of liberalism—procedural and substantive—also reveals the essentialism or liberal naturalism inherent in his stance. Evaluating the Quebec problem from within this perspective he writers, “But both [Quebec and the rest of Canada] perceived each other accurately—and didn’t like what they saw. The rest of Canada saw that the distinct society clause legitimated collective goals. And Quebec saw that the move to give the Charter precedence imposed a form of liberal society that was alien to it, and to which Quebec could never accommodate itself without surrendering its identity” (1994, 60).

Societies, accordingly, have characters that determine what kind of rights and what type of system of governance should be chosen for them. Notwithstanding that Taylor identifies societies with states, that is, he reduces the so-called “civil society” which is so dear to liberalism to political society or the state.

Taylor’s approach to Salman Rushdie’s case makes this essentialism even more evident. First, Taylor identifies Islam with the Muslim and to whoever that is born to a
“Muslim” family, society, or country. Then he states, “Liberalism is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures, but is the political expression of one range of cultures, and quite incompatible with other ranges” (1994, 62). Clearly, Taylor reproduces the aforementioned culturist stance that takes politics to be the reflection of culture. Taylor eventually defends political Islam and its totalitarian politics, because such politics is the political expression of another culture. Liberalism is not the common ground upon which cultures of different range can meet; however, this does not exclude the right of these non-liberal cultures to practice their undesirable ways in their own societies. Hence follows the peaceful coexistence of cultures. Furthermore, members of “liberal” cultures should not try to impose their political values onto the politics of a “non-liberal” culture because it would violate the right of non-liberal culture to express its values. However, it stays an enigma why Taylor and others do not show the same sensitivity when it comes to export ultra-modern weapons, technological equipment, means of communication such as computers and cell phones, automobiles and techniques of interrogation—all of which are products of the “liberal culture”—to these societies.

All in all, in order to justify this implicit defense of political Islam and its totalitarian regimes, which is the inevitable result of viewing politics as nothing but the expression of culture, Taylor claims that liberalism is the product and continuation of Christianity and Christian culture. The picture is complete: Christian religion yields to Christian Culture which finds its expression in liberalism and a half-hearted defense of basic human rights. On the contrary, Islam yields to Islamic culture, the political expression of which is political Islam and its totalitarian regimes. Taylor’s position regarding culture is the replica of Herr Bauer’s position about religion and Judaism in the “Jewish Question”, which is criticized sharply by Marx:

Herr Bauer, as a genuine, although Critical, theologian or theological Critic, could not get beyond the religious contradiction. In the attitude of the Jews to the Christian world he could see only the attitude of the Jewish religion to the Christian religion... For the orthodox theologian the whole world is dissolved in “religion and theology”... Similarly, for the radical, Critical theologian, the ability of the world to achieve freedom, is dissolved in the single abstract ability to criticise “religion and theology” as “religion and theology”. The only struggle he knows is the struggle against the religious limitations of self-consciousness, whose Critical “purity” and “infinity” is just as much a theological limitation. (1975, 110)

Parekh’s definition of culture and his approach to the problem of recognition is but another example that reveals multiculturalist conception of culture as an immutable, self-contained entity. According to Parekh, “Culture refers to a historically inherited

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4 In the Forward to the Holy Family Engels writes, “Real humanism has no more dangerous enemy in Germany than spiritualism or speculative idealism, which substitutes "self-consciousness" or the "spirit" for the real individual man and with the evangelist teaches: “It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing.” Needless to say, this incorporeal spirit is spiritual only in its imagination. What we are combating in Bauer's criticism is precisely speculation reproducing itself as a caricature. We see in it the most complete expression of the Christian-Germanic principle, which makes its last effort by transforming "criticism" itself into a transcendent power” (1975, 7).
system of meaning and significance in terms of which a group of people understand and structure their individual and collective lives” (2005, 13). There is no place for productive and reproductive activity in this definition. Culture is a historically given ready-made goods. Such depiction is a fetishist conception of culture: in this view culture is independent from humans. People may enter or exit the culture but it continues to exist. Thus Parekh writes, “Some immigrants do assimilate and others do not. And even in the former case, their children and grandchildren sometimes seek to revive aspects of their ancestral culture” (2005, 14). Despite the fact that these “aspects”, whatever they are, are revived at present-day, they are said to remain “ancestral” and archaic. This is to view these aspects and cultures in general as meta-historical and non-personal transcendence.

Parekh adopts an apologetic, closet-relativist stance. In his criticism of what he calls feminist misconception of multiculturalism he states, “The feminist critique is mistaken [in criticizing multiculturalism] because, as we saw, multiculturalism implies no such thing [as unequal treatment of women]. All it requires is that we should first understand other cultures from within before passing judgments and the criteria we employ should be shown to be universally valid” (2005, 18). There is no political and social struggle, no changes in the structure, system of beliefs, and outlook of societies (cultures) in Parekh’s view. Thus, his suggestion that we may criticize after understanding amounts to implicit approval of “cultural” practices. Parekh’s position theorizes the policy of EU with regards to the Islamic Republic in Iran: EU legitimizes its relations with the IRIP under the pretext of “critical dialogue”. Parekh makes this affinity evident while criticizing feminists: “A culture might treat women unequally in civil and political matters but give them a superior social and religious status, or treat them as inferior when young and unmarried but revere them when they are old or are grandmothers” (2005, 18). A culture may deprive women from a decent life in this world but reserve the best seats and suites for them in the heaven.

Habermas, on the other hand, tries to reconcile the liberal notions of rights and individuality with cultural rights through what he calls intersubjectivity. That is why he opens his article with the following: “Modern constitutions owe their existence to a conception found in modern natural law according to which citizens come together to form a legal community of free and equal consociates” (1994, 107). However, the Kantian notion of autonomy and the idea of free association of individuals on the basis of natural law to which he appeals are in contrast to his effort. First, this Kantian notion is based on the idea of finalized, self-contained, autonomous subject, which is an atom-like entity. Second, the notion of intersubjectivity that is based on Kantian autonomy presumes that the autonomous subjects the contract among which amount to intersubjective relations are equal, that is, it assumes they represent equal social positions. This latter supposition is empirically falsified. Culture is produced socially, but this does not mean that all the members of that culture have an equal share in producing, appropriating, and reproducing that culture. The inherent inequality that is produced and reproduced within society and in ideational realms is thus transferred onto inter-cultural realm. Habermas’ view, on the one hand, reproduces the ideological claim of the “culture” —and other totalizing ideational entities such as nation—that stamps all its “members” as “we” who are allegedly participates in its production as equal counterparts while, on the other hand, mystifies the essence of the unequal relation between different
societies by depicting cultures as uniform formations—an outlook that amounts to losing the real ground for a proper analysis of the unequal relations.

The example that Habermas uses and his elaborations on societies, communities, and cultures depict his culture-fetishist outlook. He considers societies and cultures as subjects that survive beyond the conflicts they get involved in. In other words, cultures, nations, communities, ethnicities, etc are considered as in-itself entities that will later acquire self-recognition through conflicts and become for-itself entities. The conflict between cultures, at points, is the inevitable consequence of their in-itself existences. Thus, ideologies such as nationalism and ethnicism, for Habermas, are political expression of self-recognition of nations and ethnic communities. However, a quick look at the history of nations and national states, past or present-day, show that nations and ethnicities in particular and identities in general are products of ideologies such as nationalism, ethnicism, and sectarianism. From France in eighteenth century to dissolution of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, former Soviet Union, and Iraq we witness the process of identity-constructing by competing political movements, which are the political expression of social movements in class societies. In Habermas’ view, even a phenomenon as horrifying as national cleansing is an expression of the in-itself existence of some nation.5

Habermas conceives social, social identity and socialization as identical to nature, naturality, and naturalization. He states, “From a normative point of view, the integrity of the individual legal person cannot be guaranteed without protecting the intersubjectively shared experiences and life contexts in which the person has been socialized and has formed his or her identity” (1994, 129). The question is why “socialization” and “identity formations” has come to an end? If socialization that Habermas has in view is a real dialectical process the resulting identity of such a process will be subject to perpetual change; that is, such an identity will change to the extent that the context within which the subject acts intersubjectively changes. Habermas’ conception, however, is self-undermining in that it contradicts his claim about the intersubjective construction of identity. Moreover, it reveals the essentialist core of Habermas’ consideration of subject—subjects exist prior to intersubjective interaction. Since cultures are totalities that determine the individual that is born into their context once and for all, Habermas’ stance requires him demanding separation and thus coexistence of different cultures.

In response to political aspects of identity politics Fraser distinguishes between two modes of politics: transformative and affirmative. The former may be considered a

5 Habermas states, “On the one hand, a collectivity that thinks of itself as a community with its own identity attains a new level of recognition by taking the step of becoming a nation in its own right. It cannot reach level as a pre-political linguistic and ethnic community, or even as an incorporated or a fragmented “cultural nation”. The need to be recognized as a nation-state is intensified in times of crisis, when the populace clings to the ascriptive signs of a regressively revitalized collective identity, as for instance after the dissolution of the Soviet empire. This kind of support offers dubious compensation for well-founded fears about the future and lack of social stability. On the other hand, national independence is often to be had only at the price of civil wars, new kinds of repression, or ensuing problems that perpetuate the initial conflicts with the signs reversed.”
counterpart to revolutionary action that aims at transforming the substructure of society, whereas the latter is the counterpart to reformism that intends to improve the conditions of life leaving the substructure intact. According to Fraser, affirmative approach to culture redresses disrespect toward certain groups by demanding respect for them leaving the content of these cultures intact. Transformation, on the other hand, is related to deconstruction. It redresses disrespect by changing “everyone’s sense of belonging, affiliation, and self” (1998, 32).

In its most radical form and when taken to its logical extremes, multiculturalism is pushed to challenge and reject all those social values that make the realization and actualization of human rights possible. Multiculturalist approach to humans, not as individual persons but as representatives of particular structures, represents a retreat from the notion of citizenship and the rights and the attributes of the citizen. Fraser’s elaboration on deconstructive approach to culture provides a clear instance of such upside down radicality. In general, according to Fraser, the transformative approach tends to destabilize existing identities so as to make room for future regroupments. What is ironic in this approach is that it considers groupments a deliberative decision of some kind. This is the replica of contract theories that forms the basis of liberal notion of natural right. Fraser’s view ignores the real basis of production and reproduction of ethnic, sexual, national, etc identities. Even class, in this view, is but another form of groupments, a form of deliberative identity. Thus, Fraser’s analogy between mainstream multiculturalism and liberalism, on the one hand, and deconstruction and socialism, on the other, misses the point. Socialism, at least its Marxian form, does not demand abolishing the class as a moral or purely political request (if there is anything as pure politics). Rather, it states that classes disappear as the money economy, which is the expression of commodification of labor, is abolished.

There is an inconsistency in Fraser’s formulation of the relation between “transformative” and “affirmative” politics. On the one hand, she seems to admit that relations of production are the determining factor that produces and reproduces the present-day identities such as race, ethnicity, and gender. On the other hand, she states that transformative politics is “far removed from the immediate interests and identities of most people of (color, different genders, etc) as these are currently culturally constructed” (1998, 39-40). This shows that, for Fraser, “identity” and “culture” denote sui generis entities. In other words, race, gender, ethnicity, etc come to be despite the existing social order and relations of production. In this, they are not social but are cultural. Thus, she ends up attributing eternality and meta-historicalness to culture.

Young’s formulation of injustice in a more plural way is but another example of fetishistic, reified view of culture: she proposes five categories, in contrast to Fraser’s two categories, in order to show the channels through which injustice appears in present society (1998, 54). The question, according to Young, is that why Fraser reduces these five categories to two? However, we should add, following Young’s line of reasoning, why should not we add more categories to the five she suggests?

Young claims that recognition is means to economic and social equality and freedom (1998, 56). This political stance revitalizes the nationalist forces’ claims that subordinate freedom and equality to the formation of nation-state. Young’s approach is blind to the political aspect of the ongoing social-political struggles; she buys the claims of identity-politics at its face value.
Young, at the first sight, seems to articulate a monist theory of culture and economy. She states, “Culture is economic and economy is cultural” (1998, 58). She is aware of the need for a holistic monist materialist theory of social movements. However, her formulation above is far from fulfilling this need. That everything, including culture, is economic, in Marx’s sense, means that everything in society, including human identities, is the result of productive and reproductive activity (praxis) of real human beings. Thus, Young’s alleged Marxist political economy that reduces economy to its mainstream academic meaning is a misconception of Marx’s original formulation.

Young states that because the source of oppression against identities and groups and the source of inequality between communities are cultural, the solution should also be cultural. Hence, she arrives at the necessity of the politics of difference (1998, 61). However, she ignores that identity-making is the consequence of such unequal social order. The imagery that is attributed to certain groups, e.g. women, homosexuals, and blacks, is based on stereotyping generalizations, which marks a particular group as “alien”, uniform, and self-identical. Thus, the only alternative is not adopting a politics of difference; an egalitarian position can also be adopted. Politics of difference reproduces the imagery of the dominant discriminative politics. Young criticizes Fraser for polarizing political economy and culture. Her own “plural” stance appears as monistic because she eventually reduces political economy to identity—this is an aspect she has in common with Fraser.

Young treats culture as sui generis, as an end-in-itself. She states affirmatively, “Most African-Americans who support culturally based African-American schools and universities, for example, believe that schools will best enable African-American young people to develop the skills and self-confidence to confront white society, and collectively help transform it to be more hospitable to African-American success” (1998, 63). According to this passage, society is owned by whites, it is a white society; African-Americans are alien to this society (after all they are called “African”-American); In this view, African-American, whatever this term may denote, is an identity in itself. Moreover, this view simply reproduces the “white” prejudice that treats blacks as “others” and outsiders. This view considers society as a crowd of some people that happen to have certain features such as skin color, eye color, and hair color in common. The difference between society, as put forward by this view, and nature is only nominal. Furthermore, the defining elements of this “society” are randomly chosen.

The mechanical understanding of society and economy in this view is evident in Young’s defense of “local” modes of production. She advocates protecting indigenous economy as a transformative power confronting capitalism (1998, 63). Capitalism, in Young’s view, is identified with large-scale factories and workshops and not with a form of production and relations of production, which, in essence, signifies the relation between the capital and the workforce. Young views both culture and economy through fetishist lenses.

Multiculturalism sanctifies these categories. So be the case, multiculturalism prevents a critical approach to and criticism against these historico-social phenomena, on the one hand, and legitimizes the hegemonic determination of “members” of these groups and categories and the limitations that would possibly be imposed upon people by their so-called culture, tradition, beliefs etc., on the other hand. In this way, people are left to the mercy of the arbitrary rules and regulations that are dictated by these structures,
which, in turn, means that they are left to the mercy of those who assume higher and more powerful positions within these frames. For instance, multiculturalism ferociously defends “rights” of Muslim women to be present in political society wearing headscarf while does not mention the least in defense of the rights of girl children to equal opportunities and education that have been born into Muslim families or to defend their basic rights against their parents. Neither, it is concerned with the socio-historical roots and political significance of Islamic veiling etc. It says nothing to prevent Muslim families and communities from imposing veil upon their children.

The political and social consequences of the politics that Young advocates are indicative of her theoretical stance. Right after Young gives the example about Muslims’ demand to send their girls to school in headscarves she states, “people should not suffer material disadvantage and deprivation because they are culturally different” (64). People, in Young’s view are different but they are not made different. It never appears to Young that by calling the girls that are born to Muslim families “their girls” she simply deprives these kids from their right to education, protection, etc. Kids, in this view, are the properties of their families and because these families are culturally determined they have the right to deal with their property in the way they wish, so that they “do not suffer material disadvantage”.

Conclusion
Iraqization of society is the necessary logical outcome of multiculturalist theses. In other words, what has been realized through American invasion of Iraq, that is, dividing the Iraqi society into ethnic, sectarian, and tribal factions, has in fact happened in concordance to the multiculturalist depiction of every human society. In this picture people are not citizens that have certain equal rights and duties regardless of their sex and race but are members of this or that ethnicity, religion, sect, tribe, linguistic community etc. And as it is clear from the example of Iraq, women and children, as the most vulnerable sections of society are the first hand, immediate victims of such categorization. In short, multiculturalism, despite its radical and humanitarian self-depiction, justifies, advocates and actively supports the most reactionary ideologies and activities in the name of defending cultures, traditions and cultural values. This is done in expense of real, actual humans’ lives, rights and liberties. In addition, multiculturalism and cultural relativism function as the ideological apparatus in the hand of the most reactionary regimes around the world and their “progressive” apologists to politically justify their being and their politics as the representation of certain cultural and traditional values that also allegedly determine the being of people. In The World after September 11 Mansoor Hekmat addresses the ideological aspect of the political – and military — confrontation between the two reactionary poles of state militarism and terrorism led by the US government and the Islamic terrorism and political Islam writes:

With the intensification of this conflict and particularly with the imminent US and NATO attack on Afghanistan, the ‘anti-imperialist’ defence of Islamic groups and rationalisation of their terrorist actions by reference to Israel and America’s crimes and oppressive acts, can once again gain foothold among the people and political parties of the Middle East and also among sections of the traditional radical and intellectual Left of western societies. The main ideological refuge of Islamic gangsterism and Islamic reaction in this power struggle will not be the
worn-out and openly anti-human religious and Islamic slogans, but rather the so-called ‘anti-imperialism’ of the religious-nationalist and petit bourgeois apologists. (2001/2006, 6)

The question is why multiculturalism is preferable as an ideological framework for bourgeoisie? The answer should be searched within the present day needs of capitalism, on the one hand, and the politico-historical dead-end of capitalism, which is represented in form of reactionism and reactionary backlashes, on the other hand.

Multiculturalism and cultural relativism should not be considered in relation to immediate economic benefits. As a matter of fact, the relation between economic substructure and the political and ideological superstructure is not a direct one; politics is the actualized viewpoint of a class that is concretized in form of a certain horizon and particular demands. As an ideological framework, multiculturalism is in a more immediate relation with bourgeois political horizon. Multiculturalism serves bourgeoisie in its attack against certain basic human rights that have been achieved throughout the long and permanent struggles of the working class and different social movements. The real, worldly meaning of this retreat from human identity and such universal notions as human rights or citizen and citizenship, and the emphasis on the most archaic beliefs and superstitions and their sanctification under the pretext of culture and respecting the other and the culture of other, and the return to pre-modern, medieval forms of human identification is depriving humans from their most basic rights, restricting and, at points, annihilating particular social securities and benefits, attacking the ideals of freedom and equality, and reproduction and promotion of misogyny and sexism.

Up to recent past capitalism could still suggest a model of development for the so-called underdeveloped societies, either in form of free market model or in form of state capitalism. It means that, capitalism could then provide a relatively more prosperous life for the masses, as the pre-capitalist forms of production would be replaced by capitalist mode of production. However, as the capitalist transformation of the world has been completed there is no such prospect on the horizon as long as the quality of the lives of working masses is at stake. The increase in profitability of capital is in direct contrast to the increase in the quality of the lives of working people; the removal of welfare states from the scene, the economic programs that are dictated by finance capital on a global scale and which are applied by all the states; the impoverishment of people’s lives all around the world which is manifest in form of rapid increase of the cost of most basic needs such as food; all these are among the empirical facts that justify the claim about the incommensurability of profitability of capital and the prosperity of the people. The attack on such notions as universal human rights, humanity, and citizenship should be conceived within this global political perspective. Multiculturalism is the ideological framework of bourgeoisie in service of this politics in the age of New World Order.

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